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The implications of Merleau-Ponty's thought for the practice of psychotherapy
pp. 55-74
Résumé
In his monumental work on Freud, Ricœur argues that Freud's archaeology needs to be supplemented/counterbalanced/integrated with its own incipient teleology, and he turns to Hegel to find what psychoanalysis has left undeveloped. I am convinced by Ricœur's critique, but not by his prescription: I agree that Freud's preoccupation with the past needs to be contextualized within a more comprehensive and integrated understanding of human temporality, but I propose to look in Merleau-Ponty's thought, rather than Hegel's, for that context. Both Merleau-Ponty and Hegel understand freedom and reason to be the goals which define human teleology, but Hegel's absolute reason is incompatible with Merleau-Ponty's conception of reason as essentially finite. Without pausing to argue the case, here I shall simply opt for finitude and proceed to examine the implications that Merleau-Ponty's teleology of freedom and reason has for the practice of psychotherapy.
Détails de la publication
Publié dans:
Cho Kah-Kyung (1984) Philosophy and science in phenomenological perspective. Dordrecht, Springer.
Pages: 55-74
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-009-6113-5_5
Citation complète:
Dillon Martin C, 1984, The implications of Merleau-Ponty's thought for the practice of psychotherapy. In K.-K. Cho (ed.) Philosophy and science in phenomenological perspective (55-74). Dordrecht, Springer.