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The new permissiveness in philosophy
does it provide a warrant for a new kind of religious apologetic?
pp. 119-133
Résumé
Doubtless, the very title of my paper is likely to strike readers, if such there be, as puzzling, not to say even downright perplexing. For will not many be inclined to ask what I could possibly mean by my talk of "a new permissiveness" in philosophy? Is not the regnant philosophy today none other than so-called analytic philosophy, or linguistic philosophy, if you will? And what could be more noted for its rigor and precision, not to say its very impermissiveness, than just such a philosophy? Besides, even if we grant that the newly prevailing fashions in present-day philosophy would appear to encourage a new-found permissiveness, how could anyone ever imagine that the Goodmans, the Quines, the Davidsons, or the Rortys of this world--to mention only a few from the present-day philosophic establishment--are any of them the least bit interested in exploiting such a new-found permissiveness in the interests of a supposed new-found Christian religious apologetic?
Détails de la publication
Publié dans:
Durfee Harold, Rodier David F T (1989) Phenomenology and beyond: the self and its language. Dordrecht, Springer.
Pages: 119-133
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-009-1055-3_9
Citation complète:
Veatch Henry B., 1989, The new permissiveness in philosophy: does it provide a warrant for a new kind of religious apologetic?. In H. Durfee & D.F.T. Rodier (eds.) Phenomenology and beyond (119-133). Dordrecht, Springer.