We go on with a comparative analysis of Kant's approach to the basic data of time and space as forms of Anschauung, and Husserl's phenomenological look at the essence of fundamental data within the realm of consciousness. This is a post factum analysis, and one cannot ignore the curious fact that Kant uses the term phenomenology within the context of his theory of motion (Bewegungslehre). Part of the theory is concerned with motion or tranquillity only in relation to the mode of representation — Vorstellungsart. Hence it is a phenomenon (Erscheinung) of the external senses.¹ The fact that Kant uses the German term Erscheinung together with the Greek term phenomenon is based on the distinction between that which appears and the thing in itself. That which appears is not an illusion; it presupposes the subject and the organs in relation to which it appears. Hence the emphasis is laid on what Kant calls "affection." We do not look at a datum within consciousness but at a datum in relation to the encounter between perception and what is given to perception.